Modern Webapp Penetration Testing

Hands-on Doing.

Brian (BB) King - @BBhacKing

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Day 3 Recap

- Encoding information: context matters
- SQL Injection: less common, still a great example of injection
- Credential attacks: more about policy than web dev, but still
- NoSQL doesn't mean No Injection

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Reporting

Otherwise you're just playing around.

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The Purpose, Again

- To Make Things Better
- To Make Computering Safer for Regular People

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The Pentester's Role

- Be the security "expert"
- Know how webapps work
- Know how and why wepapps fail
  - Security: just one of many worthwhile goals
  - Security: not true/false
- Communicate clearly
  - Some kind of report

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The Report Tells A Story

- They know how it's meant to work.
- Tell them how it actually worked.

- Attacks that worked
- Attacks that failed



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Screenshots Illustrate Your Story

- Illustrate, Don't Decorate

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Illustrate, Don't Decorate

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Illustrate, Don't Decorate

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Illustrate, Don't Decorate



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Coerce Your Browser Into Helping You



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Illustrate, Don't Decorate



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Illustrate, Don't Decorate

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Illustrate, Don't Decorate



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A Good Screenshot Is

Helpful	AND	Clear
• Relevant		• Legible
• Adds Useful Information		• Directs Viewer's Attention
• *Accurate*	*AND*	• *Precise*

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Screenshot Decisions

- Entire browser window, or …
- Plain screenshot, or …
- Text too small to read, or …
- Text too large to ignore
- Just the viewport, or …

- Crop to important part
- Something to direct attention
- Relevant text in image about the same size as body text around it.
- URL always included

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Thoughtful Composition



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Thoughtful Contrast



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Thoughtful Contrast



https://twitter.com/mubix/status/1272657499917815808

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Thoughtful Words

- Explain clearly to "yourself, two years ago"
- Make it obvious how to reproduce the behavior
  - Include prerequisites
  - Include breadcrumbs or similar as needed
- Stick to the facts
  - Don't blame. Not even passively.

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Attacking JSON Web Tokens

So much to practice in one small thing.

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JSON Web Tokens Are...

These things:

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JSON Web Tokens Are...

These things...

```
GET /rest/products/search?q= HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Authorization: Bearer
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJpZCI6MSwidXNlcm
5hbWUiOiIiLCJlbWFpbCI6ImFkbWluQGp1aWNlLXNoLm9wIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiOiIwMTkyMDIzYTdiYmQ3MzI1MDUxN
mYwNjlkZjE4YjUwMCIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImRlbHV4ZVRva2VuIjoiIiwibGFzdExvZ2luSXAiOiIwLjAuMC4w
IiwicHJvZmlsZUltYWdlIjoiYXNzZXRzL3B1YmxpYy9pbWFnZXMvdXBsb2Fkcy9kZWZhdWx0QWRtaW4ucG5nIiwidG
yZXQiOiIiLCJpc0FjdGl2ZSI6dHJ1ZSwiY3JlYXRlZEF0IjoiMjAyMC0wNi0wOCAyMjo1NTowNy4zMzMgKzAwOjAwIi
widXBkYXRlZEF0IjoiMjAyMC0wNi0wOCAyMjo1NTowNy4zMzMgKzAwOjAwIiwiZGVsZXRlZEF0IjpudWxsfSwiaWF0I
joxNTkxNjU3MTIxLCJleHAiOjE1OTE2NzUxMjF9.bHYionAdmkw2Nr9lwNFLW2s0zY9-THTNSAOmMZ9UOzO3CzUI4rq
x561_GQL1Tb1MnZPcnMxqy8DvUmrOOUuThOI9PxYaEZNMlX-1R3wFmWqTSXgspc0X5WEXswfUWPOJ9BQlfTAZp4e4Du
c5Ug-4T3ABK3QVf8WyZ9KzMpVdl_Y
Connection: close
```

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Not All Input Looks Like Input

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JSON Web Tokens Are...

"...a compact, **URL-safe** means of representing **claims** to be transferred between two parties.

The **claims** in a JWT are **encoded as a JSON object** that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be **digitally signed** or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted."

-- "Abstract" - RFC 7519 - May, 2015

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JSON

- JSON: Javascript Object Notation
- Key:Value pairs separated by commas.
- Values can be strings, arrays, objects.

```
{"menu": {
  "id":    "file",
  "value": "File",
  "popup": {
    "menuitem": [
      {"value": "New",   "onclick": "CreateNewDoc()"},
      {"value": "Open",  "onclick": "OpenDoc()"},
      {"value": "Close", "onclick": "CloseDoc()"}
    ]}}}
```

https://json.org/example.html

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JSON Web Tokens Contain...

JOSE Header:
```
{"typ":"JWT",
 "alg":"HS256"}
```

JOSE:
J*SON*
O*bject ...*
S*igning and*
E*ncryption*

Payload:
```
{"iss":"joe",
 "exp":1300819380,
 "role":"customer"}
```

Payload:
"the claims"

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JSON Web Tokens Are...

Base64url encoded, concatenated, signed...

```
base64url(header)
   .
      base64url(payload)
         .
            base64url(signature)
```

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Base64 vs Base64URL Encoding

To convert a Base64 string to a Base64URL string...

+ becomes -

/ becomes _

= becomes *nothing* (i.e. padding is removed)

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Clues

Base64 of JWT often begins with `eyJ0eXAi` or `eyJhbGci`

```
$ echo -n 'eyJ0eXAi' | base64 -d
{"typ"
$ echo -n '{"alg"' | base64
eyJhbGci
```

...and a dot in the first 40 - 60 characters or so...

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Aside... Why Base64?

NOT to protect information from malice.

Base64 does not do that.

Base64 ONLY makes them "URL-Safe".

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Three Parts: Header, Payload, Signature

Header Says Two Main Things:

1. This is a JWT
2. The signature was computed with *this* algorithm.

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Three Parts: Header, Payload, Signature

Payload may say a few standard things...

iss: issuer sub: subject

iat: issued at exp: expires at

nbf: "not before" (start date)

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Three Parts: Header, Payload, Signature

Payload may say ... literally anything else

- username?
- email address?
- role?
- permissions?
- password?

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Three Parts: Header, Payload, Signature

Signature is ... a digital signature

(...of the encoded header and payload, using the algorithm named in the header)

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Common Use: Federated Authentication and Authorization

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Often: HTTP "Authorization" Header

Remember this?

```
GET /rest/products/search?q= HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Authorization: Bearer
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJpZCI6MSwidXNlcm
5hbWUiOiIiLCJlbWFpbCI6ImFkbWluQGp1aWNlLXNoLm9wIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiOiIwMTkyMDIzYTdiYmQ3MzI1MDUxN
mYwNjlkZjE4YjUwMCIsInJvbGUiOiJhZG1pbiIsImRlbHV4ZVRva2VuIjoiIiwibGFzdExvZ2luSXAiOiIwLjAuMC4w
IiwicHJvZmlsZUltYWdlIjoiYXNzZXRzL3B1YmxpYy9pbWFnZXMvdXBsb2Fkcy9kZWZhdWx0LnN2ZyIsInRvdHBTZWN
yZXQiOiIiLCJpc0FjdGl2ZSI6dHJ1ZSwiY3JlYXRlZEF0IjoiMjAyMC0wNi0wOCAyMjo1NTowNy4zMzMgKzAwOjAwIi
widXBkYXRlZEF0IjoiMjAyMC0wNi0wOCAyMjo1NTowNy4zMzMgKzAwOjAwIiwiZGVsZXRlZEF0IjpudWxsfSwiaWF0I
joxNTkxNjU3MTIxLCJleHAiOjE1OTE2NzUxMjF9.bHYionAdmkw2Nr9lwNFLW2sOzY9-THTNSAOmMZ9UOzO3CzUI4rq
x561_GQL1Tb1MnZPcnMxqy8DvUmrOOUuThOI9PxYaEZNMlX-1R3wFmWqTSXgspc0X5WEXswfUwP0J9BQlfTAZp4e4Du
c5Ug-4T3ABK3QVf8WyZ9KzMpVdl_Y
Connection: close
```

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Aside... one "obvious" reason for base64

JSON can have newlines.

HTTP headers can't.

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RFCs of Interest
7519: JWT (...Tokens)
7518: JWA (...Algorithms)
7515: JWS (...Signatures)
7516: JWE (...Encryption)

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Most JWTs are JWSes...

Encoded, not *encrypted*.

...therefore readable. *Always*.

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Most JWTs are JWSes...

A good signature allows tampering to be detected.

Signing algorithm is part of the header

...therefore attacker-controllable. ...*Always*.

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Most JWTs are JWSes...

So...

Servers need to be careful.

More "bouncer" than "concierge"

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1. Do Not Trust User Input

2. Everything is User Input

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How Many Issues in the OWASP Top Ten?

1. Injection
2. Broken Authentication
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
4. XML External Entities
5. Broken Access Control
6. Security Misconfiguration
7. Cross-Site Scripting
8. Insecure Deserialization
9. Using … Known Vulnerabilities
10. Insuff. Logging and Monitoring

1. Malicious Input
2. Unexpected Input
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
4. Malicious Input
5. Malicious / Unexpected Input
6. Unexpected Input
7. Malicious Input
8. Malicious Input
9. Malicious input
10. Insuff. Logging and Monitoring

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How Many Issues in the OWASP Top Ten?

1-2: Unexpected User Input

3: Sensitive Data Exposure (leaks)

4-9: Unexpected User Input

10. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

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Signature Algorithms (RFC 7518)...

3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS

"alg" Value	Digital Signature or MAC Algorithm	Implementation Req'ts
HS256	HMAC using SHA-256	Required
RS256	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256	Recommended
none	No digital signature or MAC performed	Optional

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That "none" option looks dangerous...

"Resistance to tampering"

3.6. Using the Algorithm "none"

JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection.

Such a JWS is called an Unsecured JWS. **An Unsecured JWS uses the "alg" value "none"** and is formatted identically to other JWSs, but MUST use the **empty octet sequence as its JWS Signature** value.

Recipients MUST verify that the JWS Signature value is the empty octet sequence.

If it's empty...
...how do you know it's an octet sequence?

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RFC 7518 (J.W. Algorithms)
The "none" algorithm is optional!

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Signature Algorithms (RFC 7519)

8. Implementation Requirements

This section defines which algorithms and features of this specification are mandatory to implement. . . .

Of the signature and MAC algorithms specified in JSON Web Algorithms [JWA], only HMAC SHA-256 ("HS256") and **"none" MUST be implemented** by conforming JWT implementations.

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RFC 7519 (JWT):
The "none" algorithm is required.

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JWT's Stance on Privacy

12. Privacy Considerations

A JWT may contain privacy-sensitive information. When this is the case, measures MUST be taken to prevent disclosure of this information to unintended parties.

... [*Encrypt the JWT and/or use TLS*] ...

Omitting privacy-sensitive information from a JWT is the simplest way of minimizing privacy issues.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-12

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Encrypt the JWT and/or use TLS

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JWS's Stance on Security

(A JWS is the kind of JWT you normally see: one whose claims are not encrypted)



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...leaving us with...

No privacy protections in a JWT (*JWS*)

The "none" algorithm disables signing completely

The "none" algorithm is ... required? optional? ...both?

Attacks, then:

1. Information disclosure (just decode the payload)
2. Potential for forgery (if the "none" algorithm is supported)
3. Cracking (guess the "secret" if 1 & 2 don't work)

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On Cracking...

- HMAC only as secure as the secret.
- JWT is self-contained.
- Sample code uses bad examples.
- Guess all day long on your own system.

https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken

Synchronous Sign with default (HMAC SHA256)

```
var jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
var token = jwt.sign({ foo: 'bar' }, 'shhhhh');
```

hashcat @hashcat · Jan 21, 2018
Support added to crack JWT (JSON Web Token) with hashcat at 365MH/s on a single GTX1080:

$ ./hashcat -m 16500 hash.txt -a 3 -w 3 ?a?a?a?a?a?
a hashcat (v4.0.1-95-gce0cee - Pastebin.com
pastebin.com

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On Cracking...

- Wordlist suggestion: "secrets" from example code
  - https://github.com/BBhacKing/jwt_secrets
- Collected from all 97 projects linked at https://jwt.io/

- See also:
- https://github.com/wallarm/jwt-secrets/
- Longer list, less focused



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Lab #13:
JWT: Information Disclosure
JWT: Forge a JWT

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User Secrets in Juice Shop

1. Find a JWT in Juice Shop
2. Decode it. Find what's inside.
   - Try several tools: how do they differ?
3. Forge a JWT.

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User Secrets in Juice Shop

1. Log in as your user
2. Notice this exists: http://localhost:3000/rest/user/whoami
3. Send "whoami" request to Repeater & re-send it
4. Trim out extra junk to simplify (which JWT is the important one?)
5. Decode (CyberChef, Burp Decoder, etc): Look at the payload - anything interesting?
6. Decide what you might do with that information alone.

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User Secrets in Juice Shop

6. Decide what you might do with the decoded information.
7. Try the "JOSEPH" Extension's "signature exclusion" attack.
8. Then: create a forged JWT that Juice Shop accepts.

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Lab #13 *Complete:*
Forge a JWT

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What's Your Takeaway from the Lab?

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WebSockets

Not really HTTP, but not really anything else, either

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WebSockets...

- Enable bi-directional messages between clients and servers
- Allow servers to send things not explicitly requested
- Free browsers from having to poll for server-side changes

"...can be used for a variety of web applications: games, stock tickers, multiuser applications with simultaneous editing, user interfaces exposing server-side services in real time, etc."

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455

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WebSockets...

- Follows the "origin model"
  - Same basis as the "Same Origin Policy" browsers rely on
- Scheme in URLs is ws:// or wss://
- Request headers
  - Connection: Upgrade
  - Upgrade: websocket
  - Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
  - Sec-WebSocket-Key (16-byte random nonce, base64 encoded)
  - Origin: http://example.com

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Opening Handshake, from RFC 6455

```
GET /chat HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
Origin: http://example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: chat, superchat
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
```

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Opening Handshake, from Juice Shop



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WebSocket Security

HTTP Response Header "Sec-WebSocket-Accept" is...

sec-websocket-key from the request

with a constant RFC-specified GUID appended

SHA-1 hash

Base64 Encode

```
base64(sha1(vOBHS/qD8tr+2rfJjBmFjg==258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11))
```

```
Yields this: HyFbyYrOmKmb+sw/EEVdSTLh9gQ=
```

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WebSocket Security

Server knows it's a legit client because of the Origin request header.

...unless it's not a browser

Client knows it's talking to legit server because the client provided the randomness that's part of the web-socket-accept header in the response...

Wait.

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WebSocket Security

- To the RFC!

10.1 Non-Browser Clients:

While this protocol is intended to be used by scripts in web pages, it **can also be used directly by hosts ... [which can] ... send fake |Origin| header fields**... Servers should therefore be careful about assuming that they are talking directly to scripts from known origins and must consider that **they might be accessed in unexpected ways**. In particular, **a server should not trust that any input is valid**.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455#section-10.1

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WebSocket Security

- To the RFC!

10.1 Non-Browser Clients, cont'd:

EXAMPLE: If the server uses input as part of SQL queries, **all input text should be escaped** before being passed to the SQL server, lest the server be susceptible to SQL injection.



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WebSocket

- Not different enough from HTTP to be ”hard”
- Just need the right tools

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Lab #14:
Abuse a Web Socket

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Abuse a WebSocket

- Find the client-directed message that shows the banners.
- Trigger a banner for a challenge you didn't earn
  - …or make it say anything you can use to your advantage

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Lab #14 *Complete:*
Abuse a Web Socket

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Review...

- To the RFC!

10.5 WebSocket Client Authentication:

This protocol **doesn't prescribe any particular way that servers can authenticate clients** during the WebSocket handshake. The WebSocket server can use any client authentication mechanism available to a generic HTTP server, such as cookies, HTTP authentication, or TLS authentication.

Did you see any cookies or authentication in the WebSocket history?

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What's Your Takeaway from the Lab?

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Webapp Pentesting is *Advanced "Paying Attention"*

...once you know what to look for.

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Lab:
Choose Your Own Adventure.

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"There is never enough time.
Thank you for yours."

-- Dan Geer

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