# Qubes OS R2 Tutorial

INVISIBLE THINGS LAB LINUXCON EUROPE, OCT 2014, V1.0-RC1



## Agenda

### Part 1 (for Users)


- Basics (Trusted Desktop, AppVMs, TemplateVMs)
- Networking (NetVMs, ProxyVMs, Firewalling, TorVM)
- Storage (Block devices handling, UsbVM)
- Disposable VMs (Unique features, customizations)
- Qubes Apps (grexec basics, Split GPG, PDF convert)
- Windows AppVMs (installation, templates)

Part 2 (for Power Users & Devs)

- Qubes Inter-VM services (grexec, policies)
- Hello World Qubes grexec App
- Qubes Builder (Build your own Qubes, contribute patches, components)
- Porting Window Managers (e.g. Awsome)
- New templates (e.g. Debian-based)
- Quick look at Qubes R3 changes

# Qubes OS Basics

### Architecture



### Qubes as multi-domain system

- Domains represent areas, e.g.
  - personal, work, banking
  - work-web, work-project-XYZ, work-accounting
  - personal-very-private, personal-health
- No 1-1 mapping between apps and VMs!
  - If anything, then user tasks-oriented sandboxing, not app-oriented
  - E.g. few benefits from sandboxing: The Web Browser, or The PDF Reader
- It's data we want protect, not apps/system!


### Trusted Desktop

> Apps windows "extracted" from VMs and composed onto **common desktop** 

6

Clear indications to which VM a given window belongs


## Trusted Desktop Decorations



### Trusted Desktop

- **•** × TX packets 6 bytes 380 (380.0 B) TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0 Disk Space 📳 🔒 🗲 🖑 👰 🕫 LinuxCon 2014 Qubes Tutorial - PowerPoint (Trial) ? 🗈 – 🗆 🗙 Joanna Rutkowska 👻 🔘 INSERT DESIGN TRANSITIONS ANIMATIONS SLIDE SHOW REVIEW FILE HOME VIEW 🎢 Find TX packets 460016 bytes 480210413 (457.9 MiB) 🔚 🔝 Layout 🖄 Shape Fill 🐐 36 - A A A ・ 三・ モ 毛 注・ TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 Shape Outline 😭 Reset ab ac Replace New Paste Shapes Arrange Quick IUS abc AV - Aa -0s1: flags=4163⊲UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST≻ mt inet 192.168.10.104 netmask 255.255.255.0 br inet6 fe80::120b:a9ff:fe67:1b4 prefixlen 64 Slide - 😁 Section -Styles - 📿 Shape Effects -Select -Clipboard 🗔 Slides Font Paragraph Drawing Editing ether 10:0b:a9:67:01:b4 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethe RX packets 482801 bytes 502694512 (479.4 MiB) work-web] TweetDeck × Y Emergency Kittens (@ × RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0 TX packets 365807 bytes 85704905 (81.7 MiB) ⊿ Part1 → C 
Twitter, Inc. [US] https://twitter.com/ Trusted Desktop Apps 🔰 TweetDeck 🔞 DuckDuckGo </u> Google 🗀 ot@netvm user]# 🗌 740 E Click to add text Desktop (wallpaper) managed by Dom0 WM **Emergency Kittens** @EmrgencyKitter For when you need a kitten (or of Click to add notes type of cat) to cheer you up 🚔 NOTES 📮 COMMENTS 🛛 🖳 SLIDE 6 OF 20 kittensdaily.com "Start Menu" managed 1 1 2K P by Dom0 WM Qubes OS Practical thiro by Invisible Things Lab, 2014 22:13 A LinuxCon 2014 Qubes Tutorial - PowerPoi A Emergency Kittens (@EmrgencyKittens)

## Trusted Desktop (Apps launcher)



0

### Secure clipboard

- Challenge: copy clipboard from VM "Alice" to VM "Bob", don't let VM "Mallory" to learn its content in the meantime
- Solved by introducing Qubes "global clipboard" to/from which copy/paste is explicitly controlled by the user (Ctrl-Shift-C, Ctrl-Shift-V)
- Requires 4 stages:
  - Ctrl-C (in the source VM)
  - Ctrl-Shift-C (tells Qubes: copy this VM buffer into global clipboard)
  - Ctrl-Shift-V (in the destination VM: tells Qubes: make global clipboard available to this VM)
  - Ctrl-V (in the destination VM)
- Ctrl-Shift-C/V cannot be injected by VMs (unspoofable key combo).
- In practice almost as fast as traditional 2-stage copy-paste (don't freak out! ;)

## Types of VMs in Qubes

### According to role

- AppVMs (user apps and files run here)
- ServiceVMs (mostly invisible to the user)
  - NetVMs
  - ProxyVMs (e.g. FirewallVM, TorVM, VPN)
  - Dom0 (admin domain)
  - ► GUI domain (in R3)
- Templates

### According to implementation

- PV (default) ^ HVM (e.g. Windows)
- Template-based ^ Standalone
- Persistent ^ Disposable

## AppVMs

### Linux-based Para Virtualized

- Most Desktop Environment stripped off, custom startup.
- Quick boot, small memory footprint
- Based on a template (Fedora 20 default, but Debian & Arch also avail.)

- This means rootfs is non persistent by default!
- Separate volume (virtual disk) for user home (/rw)
- Disposable VMs
  - Like AppVMs, but without private volume (non persistent home dir)
  - Optimized to boot up even faster (restored from snapshot instead of boot)

### TemplateVMs

Started only for software upgrade/installation or global config mods

13

- By default limited networking only to apt/yum updates proxy
- Trusted a compromised template can compromise all "children"
- Non-persistence of rootfs
  - as reliability feature
  - as security feature

### Rootfs non-persistence as security feature?

> AppVM's rootfs gets automatically reverted back to "golden image" on each restart...

- No malware persistence on root fs!
- ... but malware can still place its triggers in /home (generally /rw):
  - .bashrc
  - Thunderbird/Firefox/etc profile directory (e.g. subvert plugins)
  - Malicious PDF/DOC/etc (exploiting hypothetical bug in default handler app)
  - Malicious fs meta (exploiting hypothetical bug in kernel fs module)

### Rootfs non-persistence as security feature? (cont.)

- ... still has some unique security advantages though:
  - Malware inactive before /rw mounted/parsed, offers chances to scan reliably
    - > Yet problem for malware scanning generally hard in general
    - ▶ But might be easier for limited scenarios (e.g. easy for .bashrc, difficult for TB profile)
  - Malware triggers via malicious docs or malformed fs will automatically stop working after template patched
    - Note how this malware in AppVMs cannot interfere with reliability of template patching

### Where are the VM files?

- /var/lib/qubes
  - appvms/-
  - > servicevms/
  - vm-templates/\_\_\_\_
  - vm-kernels/

- appvms/my-appvm/
  - > private.img
  - volatile.img
  - my-appvm.conf (autogen!)
  - vm-templates/fedora-20-x64/
    - root.img
    - root-cow.img
    - private.img (template's home)

- volatile.img
- fedora-20-x64.conf (autogen!)

### 17

## HVM AppVMs (e.g. Windows-based)

[work-office] Libraries	
Computer ►	• • • Search Co •
Organize   Properties System properties Uninstall or change a program   >>>	<b>•</b> • <b>• •</b>
<ul> <li>Downloads</li> <li>Recent Places</li> <li>Hard Disk Drives (2)</li> <li>Hard Disk Drives (2)</li> <li>Music</li> <li>Music</li> <li>Music</li> <li>Pictures</li> <li>Videos</li> <li>Local Disk (C:)</li> <li>Local Disk (C:)</li> <li>Qubes Private Im</li> </ul>	
Qubes Private Image (D:)       Space used:       Total size: 1.99 GB         Image Local Disk       Space free: 1.56 GB       File system: NTFS	

## AppVMs configuration

### /rw/config


- /rw/config/rc.local
- /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/UserDoc/ConfigFiles
- qvm-service
  - Tells VM's scripts which (systemd) services should/shouldn't be started

- Note: qvm-service will not warn you about service name spelling errors
- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmService

19


# Networking in Qubes OS

## Default networking topology



20

# The whole networking stacks is sandboxed...



2013-02-25

### 22


# Type of VMs (networking-wise)

#### NetVMs

- Have NICs or USB modems assigned via PCI-passthrough
- Provide networking to other VMs (run Xen Net Backends)
- AppVMs
  - Have no physical networking devices assigned
  - Consume networking provided by other VMs (run Xen **Net Frontends**)
  - Some AppVMs might not use networking (i.e. be network-disconnected)
- ProxyVMs
  - Behave as AppVMs to other NetVMs (or ProxyVMs), i.e. consume networking
  - Behave as NetVMs to other AppVMs (or ProxyVMs), i.e. provide networking
  - Functions: firewalling, VPN, Tor'ing, monitoring, proxying, etc.
- Dom0
  - has no network interfaces!

# Example of more complex networking configuration...

23



### FirewallVM: special role of any ProxyVM

- Any proxy VM becomes firewall VM for the AppVMs (or other ProxyVMs) directly connected to it
- Scripts running in each of the ProxyVM look at the global firewalling config provided by Dom0 (via XenStore) and use it to configure iptables rules for its direct children
- The role of the FirewallVM is not to prevent data leaks!
  - Sadly too many cooperative covert channels for this to be meaningful
  - > They are to prevent user mistakes, config mistakes, and accidental leaks only

### 25

## Networking config inside VMs

### Interfaces

- ▶ Firewall
- NAT

### 26

## Customizing networking routings

- Allow networking between two AppVMs
- Allow port forwarding to an AppVM from outside world
- See:
  - https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/QubesFirewall


### Qubes TorVM

### Easy setup

- qvm-create -p torvm
  - qvm-service torvm -d qubes-netwatcher

- qvm-service torvm -d qubes-firewall
- qvm-service torvm -e qubes-tor
- ▶ In TorVM (or its template):
  - sudo yum install qubes-tor-repo
  - sudo yum install qubes-tor
- Configure AppVMs to use it as proxy:
  - qvm-pres –s myanonvm netvm torvm

## TorVM configuration example



28

### Digression on using TorVM in Qubes OS

- TorVM cannot (obviously) anonymize anything beyond IP/MAC
  - ▶ Use e.g. TBB or Whonix workstation in/as clients of TorVM
- DispVMs as TorVM clients
  - Set DispVM's netvm to none, manually change to torvm (or set torvm for all DispVMs)
  - Note the volatile.img is backed to disk! (no anti-forensics yet)
- Potential leaks through:
  - ▶ qvm-open-in-dvm ...
  - Set default netvm to none, manually change to torvm (or set torvm for all DispVMs)
  - adjust greater policy to prevent that (gubes.OpenInVM, gubes.VMShell)

## Further reading


http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2011/09/playing-with-qubesnetworking-for-fun.html 30

https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/UserDoc

31

# Storage, Block devices and USB

### Architecture



## Storage backend in Qubes

- Dom0 hosts block backend for all the VMs
  - The simplest possible block backend (Xen blkback), no qcow, no qemu!


33

- Also possible to use backends located in (untrusted) VMs
  - E.g. export block devices from UsbVM
  - qvm-block
  - https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/StickMounting

## Examples of USBVM usage

### USB storage device attach example





34

## Keeping USBVM untrusted

- Backups to USBVM
- LUKS on /dev/xvdi exported from USBVM

### 36

# Backing up to untrusted USB

[Dom0] Qubes VM Manager	- *	[Dom0] Qubes Backup VMs	?	n'i la
System VM View About		Backup destination dire	ectory	Disk Space
		Device: None	~	noot 137.4 GiB
Vi i Name i State i CPU	I MEM I	Target AppVM: usbvm	~	boot 302.5 MiB
dom0 🔹 📃 17 %	6545 MB	Backup directory or VM command: //run/media/user/7f927e3f-2659-463	L0-b000-449db2d5a2d2/joanna	boot 302.5 MiB
🧐 🔒 usbvm 🔍 🔍 0 %	400 MB	VM command: ()/uli/media/user//1927e3i-2039-40	10-0000-44900203a202/joanna	
		Backup security		
		Encrypt backup: 🗹		
		Encryption / Verification passphrase:		
		Reenter passphrase:		
	[usbvm] Qubes			
[Dom0] joanna : bash – Konsole	📝 < media	user d7e105d7-e13f-4368-b1d2-7be813d8c6a6 joanna	Create Folder	
[joanna@domO ~]\$ lsusb unable to initialize libusb: -99 [joanna@domO -]\$ []	Places	Name v Size	Modified	
[joanna@domO ~]\$ [	⊘ Recent	📔 qubes-backup-2014-06-08T152336 284.5 C	3B 06/08/14 ext > Cancel	
	n Home	💾 qubes-backup-2014-07-13T151126 322.1 C	5B 07/13/14	
	🛅 Desktop			
	Documents			
	Downloads			
	Music			
	Videos			
	Devices			
	Setters I.0 TB ∨ 4			
	Computer			
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joanna : bash				
Ctical Inico by Invisible Things Lab, 2014	Oubes VM Manager	Qubes Backup VMs	uhas	19:52
Ne	Qubes VM Manager	U Qubes Backup VMs	upes	

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....

🚨 Devices | 🍕 Applications | Services

Backend domain: installs

Type:

Path:

cdrom

Additional drive

-builder/iso/Qubes-R2-x86\_64-DVD.iso

#### Booting HVMs from images

Places       O Recent       Home       Devices	Name win_7_pro_x64_en.iso win_vista_ultimate_x64_en.iso win_xp_pro_sp2_en.iso		Modified 08/02/13 08/02/13 08/02/13						boot 3
Computer Bookmarks Documents Music Pictures		Cancel	ОК	Memo Initial memory: Max memory: VCPUs no.: Include in mer dir:, config:, root volatile img:, root volatile img:	Firewall rules	Type: Backend domain: Path: Paths Is/test-hvm Is/test-hvm/root.im Is/test-hvm/root.im	-builder/iso/Qubes-R2-x86_64 vm.conf 1g	P = D	X
							<b>√</b> 0K	Cancel	ļ

## qvm-usb (EXPERIMENTAL)

- qvm-usb != qvm-block
  - > qvm-block attaches *block* devices (e.g. USB mass storage device) to VMs

- qvm-usb (is supposed to) attaches USB devices (e.g. camera) to VMs
- qvm-block works, qvm-usb (mostly) doesn't (currently)
- Current problems with qvm-usb
  - > Xen PVUSB backend is immature, devel seem abandoned
  - We consider switching to USB-over-IP from Linux kernel, replace IP for grexec

#### Dom0 storage

#### /boot

Not encrypted, not integrity protected (cannot be!)

- Use Anti Evil Maid
- Dom0 root filesystem
  - LUKS
  - No integrity protection!
    - Malleability attacks possible
    - Difficult to do integrity protection on block-level
  - No anti-forensics (yet)
    - DispVM volatile.img backing to Dom0 fs

# Qubes Apps

#### Qubes Apps Examples

- InterVM file copy
- Disposable VMs, qvm-open-in-(d)vm
- Thunderbird Open-in-DispVM extension
- PDF converter
- Split GPG
  - Comparison vs. Smartcard (need for USB controller passthrough)

41

Key import

## Trivial: Inter-VM filecopy


- Security challenges
  - Virtual pendrive: no good
  - Samba, NFS: no good
- qubes.FileCopy
  - minimal cpio-like format
  - qvm-copy-to-vm

[work] Home < >			[Dom0] Questio	R.	
Places       Places <sup>©</sup> Recent <sup>†</sup> Home <sup>D</sup> Documents	Desktop	Documents	Ye Ye	o you allow domain "work" to execute qubes.Filecopy peration on the domain "work-archives"? Yes to All" option will automatically allow this operation iture.	in the
Downloads Husic	Public	QubesIncom			140
D Pictures			Сору		
🗐 Videos			Paste Into Folder		
💮 Trash			Move To		
Devices			Сору То		
🔄 11 GB Vol			Make Link		
Computer "Documents" sele		d (containing 1 ite	Rename		
			Move to Trash		
			Send To		
			Compress		
			Convert to trusted PDF		
			Copy to other AppVM		
			Open in DisposableVM		
			Revert to Previous Versio	ion	
			Properties		


## Thunderbird extension

[work-email] Add-ons Manager - Mozilla Thu	inderbird	_ 0
<u>File Edit View Go M</u> essage Enigm <u>a</u> i		
🖄 Inbox 🥖 🤹 Add	-ons Manager ×	
	Search all add-ons	Q
	Enigmail 1.7.2	
📥 Get Add-ons	OpenPGP message encryption and authentication <u>More</u>	Disable
a Extensions	Qubes Attachments 1.2.5 Qubes actions for attachments like "Open in DVM" or "Send to V <u>More</u> <b>Preferences</b>	Disable
Appearance		
Plugins		
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## Qubes Split GPG



#### Qubes PDF Converter



#### qrexec policy

- Central place to allow/deny inter-VM services
- E.g. disallow "personal" to request qubes.FileCopy from "work"

- E.g. disallow any VM to copy clipboard to "vault"
- E.g. allow any VM to open files in a fresh DispVM without asking
- See /etc/qubes-rpc/policy (also later slides in Part 2)

# Qubes OS: Part II For Power Users & Devs

# Qubes Inter-VM Services: **qrexec**

#### Inter-VM interactions

VMs, to be useful for anything, must be able to communicate with each other, and/or with devices 49

- Device virtualization (Networking, Storage, Other devices)
- XenStore (Xen system-wide registry)
- Qubes GUI virtualization (GUI protocol)
- Qubes RPC: qrexec

#### Inter-VM comm mechanisms in Xen Level 1: Shared Memory

- Grant tables hypercall (setting up shared pages between VMs)
- **Event Channel** hypercall (inter-VM signaling, kind of like UNIX signals)
- All Xen frontends/backends communicate using these mechanisms
  - Xen hypervisor <u>doesn't</u> enforce/look into this communication
  - Xen provides convenient macros (via .h) that might be used for a primitive frontend-backend protocols (so called Ring Buffers)

#### Inter-VM comm mechanisms in Xen: Level 2: vchan

#### **vchan** is a usermode library

- Written in early days by Qubes project
- Merged into Xen starting from 4.2+ (much improved over "ours")
- Qubes R2 still based on Xen 4.1, using "our old vchan", R3 uses Xen libvchan.
- Builds on top of Grant Tables and Event Channels (see the previous slide)
- Exposes socket-like "pipe" connecting two VMs
  - Qubes R2 limitation: one of the VMs is assumed to be Dom0
  - Qubes R3 (Xen 4.2+): between any two VMs

#### Inter-VM comm mechanism in Qubes: Level 3: grexec (only in Qubes OS currently)

#### Qubes qrexec is:


- Inter-VM protocol that runs over vchan
- A set of tools (qrexec-agent, qrexec-client{-vm}, qrexec-daemon)
- A policy framework
- qrexec is a framework for running programs in other VMs with their stdin/stdout piped together, all controlled by a central policy
- Each VM defines a set of services it can handle and by which programs:
  - /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.XYZ files

#### qrexec policy


Example: prevent clipboard copy

- /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/
- Example services:
  - qubes.ClipboardPaste
  - qubes.FileCopy
- ► Example policies:
  - \$anyvm vault deny
  - personal work deny
  - \$anyvm \$anyvm ask

## qrexec implementation (Qubes R2)



### qrexec implementation (Qubes R3)




55

#### qrexec: Hello World!

#### Client program (runs in VM1):

- convert\_btc\_to\_eur.sh <btc amount>
- Let's assume client VM has no networking
- Server program (runs in VM2)
  - btc\_to\_eur\_server.sh
- Service name: myservice.ConvertBtcEur
  - /etc/qubes-rpc/myservice.ConverterBtcEur in VM2
  - /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/myservice.BtcConverter in Dom0



#### qrexec: further reading

- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/Qrexec
- http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2013/02/converting-untrusted-pdfsinto-trusted.html

58

- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/Qrexec2Implementation
- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/Qrexec3Implementation

Qubes Builder

59

## Why?

- > Fetches all Qubes git repos, downloads all the additional source code
  - Additional code e.g.: linux-3.12.23.tar.xz, xen-4.1.6.1.tar.gz, zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
- > Verifies digital signatures on all downloaded code, before it gets used!
  - BTW, special patch for Xen Makefile not to wget dozens of components over http...;)

- Allows to specify which public keys are trusted for which components
  - E.g. we don't want KDE devel signs to approve our GIT commits!
  - Actually KDE doesn't use any keys, but that's another story ;)
- Useful targets: get-sources, prepare-merge, etc. All check for known digital signature on the latest commit (HEAD)

#### qubes-builder anatomy

- One big Makefile, really :)
  - Plus some helper scripts
- chroot()-based
  - chroot not considered a security container

#### qubes-builder usage

#### builder.conf

- Which components (git repos)
- Where repos are to be fetched from, which branches, etc.

- What distros to build for
- makefile targets
  - get-sources
  - prepare-merae GIT\_SUBDIR=marmarek
  - qubes
  - ▶ sign-all
  - update-repo-current{-testing}

## Building Qubes from scratch

- git clone qubes-builder.git
- ▶ gpg –import ...
- git describe && git tag –v
- cp builder.conf.default builder.conf
- [vim builder.conf]
- make get-sources qubes [sign-all] iso

## Building selected components

- make core-admin qubes-app-pdf-converter
- make COMPONENETS="core-admin qubes-app-pdf-converter" qubes

## Future

- Support for deterministic builds
- Make it work without networking
  - with qubes yum proxy at least
- Better support for non-Linux-based systems
- Use VMs instead of chroot for better isolation of components builds

# Porting Window Managers


## Porting Windows Managers to Qubes

67

#### Intro

- Trusted desktop
- guid
- Exported window properties
- Customization
  - Remove useless features (e.g. File Manager, Web browser not needed in Dom0)
  - Ensure "Start Menu" usable with Qubes app shortcuts
- Packaging
- Example: Awesome

## Qubes desktop



68

## guid process exports X properties

69

#### \_QUBES\_VMNAME

String containing VM name

#### \_QUBES\_LABEL

Index to table of supported VM "colors"

#### Appmenus

- Shortcuts for starting apps in AppVMs
- Standard .desktop files
  - Exec = qvm-run –a personal Firefox
  - Automatically generated by core-admin-linux, data obtained from VMs

7C

- qubes.GetAppmenus
- qubes.GetImageRGBA
- For most Window Manager nothing is required to be done here

# Preparing New VM Templates

#### What makes a Qubes VM template?

#### root.img

#### Qubes-specific agents

- GUI
- qrexec
- qrexec service (qubes.FileCopy, qubes.OpenInVM)
- startup core scripts
- VM services stripping
- /rw linking (e.g. /home, /usr/local)
- Qubes templates in R2 are assumed to be PV, not HVM

## Typical steps when making template

- Boot distro as HVM
- Build and try Qubes core & GUI agents
- Packaging of the Qubes components (rpm, deb, etc)
- Installing distro in chroot (e.g. debootstrap)
  - For qubes-builder (for components builds)
  - Also for template builder (for root.img build)
- Adjusting builder scripts
- Building and packaging the template
- Posting to qubes-devel, getting template uploaded to templates-community "AppStore" :)

## Example of practical porting

- Debian and Arch Linux Templates builds examples
- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/BuildingNonFedoraTemplate
- https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/BuildingArchlinuxTemplate

# What's coming in Qubes R3?

# Qubes Odyssey Philosophy

- Qubes is not a hypervisor/VMM
- Isolation is (relatively) easy, it's integration requires for desktop system that is hard. Qubes specializes in the latter.

- Users of other VMMs might also benefit from "Qubes approach"
- Let's treat VMM as "isolation provider", allow to use different VMMs
- Other VMMs might offer following benefits
  - Better h/w compatibility (perhaps sacrificing some security)
  - Better isolation, e.g. covert channel reduction (perhaps sacrificing some performance)
  - Different usemodels, e.g. Qubes in the Cloud?

#### Qubes Odyssey HAL (Hypervisor Abstraction Layer)

- Run any hypervisor instead of Xen
  - KVM, VMWare, Hyper-V, Linux LXC even perhaps
- Porting comprises
  - libvirt driver for particular VMM
  - VMM-specific implementation of vchan
  - A few config files (VMM config, storage config)
  - GUI daemon: (presently ugly)#ifdef replacement for xc\_map\_foreign\_pages()

#### Qubes R3

- Qubes R2 rewrite to Odyssey HAL
- Core to be released soon
- New release cycle & versioning:
  - 3.0-rc1, -rc2, ... (ISO might not build even!)
  - 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.0.2 < stable release, bug fixes only</p>

- ▶ 3.1-rc1, -rc2, ... < introducing new features
- 3.1.0, 3.1.1 < stable release with bug fixes</p>
- etc

## Master Signing Key

► 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494